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THE CULTURE AND CONFLICT REVIEW 
Re-examining the Environment-Conflict Linkage: In What Way Can the
Environment “Cause” Conflict?
Daniel Clausen, 4/22/2011 
Increasingly, policymakers and security planners have become more attentive to the relationship
between environmental variables and conflict. This interest has accelerated as analyses of the security
implications of climate change have made their way into think tank reports, popular books, and most
importantly official national security documents like the National Security Strategy and Quadrennial
Defense Review.[1] In addition to acknowledging the challenge of decreasing greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, these reports also examine the various regional effects of climate change and how the
military might be tasked with responding to regional contingencies involving disasters or violence
influenced by environmental factors. These reports tend to converge on a common representation of
climate change as a “threat multiplier.”[2] As these reports predict, as climate change impacts
ecosystems it will cause critical food and water shortages, spur mass migration, and strain government
capacities and credibility, thus leading to more conflict and the collapse of order. According to these
reports, the first victims will likely be states that lack reserve capacities in capital, scientists, engineers,
or flexible political institutions able to adjust to the effects of climate change. In addition, the reports
state that these ecologically-induced crises could destabilize entire regions, feeding terrorist movements
and sparking interstate conflicts and civil wars.[3]
While the common image these reports depict is both plausible and analytically useful, it also suffers
from multiple uncertainties, not the least of which is that stemming from the environment-conflict linkage.
Currently, the exact interaction between environmental factors, political institutions, and outcomes are
anything but certain. Scholars who are actively engaged in studying what has been termed
“environmental security” often disagree in stark terms on the precise relationship between environmental
variables and the onset of conflict, both civil war and interstate.
This article will discuss exactly how the environment—and the various variables that have been
considered under this label—might be understood to “cause” conflict. As this article will show, one of the
particular complications of studying the environment-conflict linkage is that the relationship between
environmental factors and conflict is rarely straight forward, and thus, is left open to interpretation by
scholars from different backgrounds and theoretical orientations. Sometimes acrimony between different
schools can take place on either definitional grounds or even on differences on what is worthy of study.
Environmental factors can encompass anything from environmental degradation, to renewable resource
scarcity, to non-renewable resource scarcity, to resource abundance (having a commodity that is highly
valued on the world market)[4]. Scholars have disagreed on which if any of these variables is important
in conflict onset and intensity. In addition, there is disagreement about how to study environmental
factors, whether the environment or resources can or should be theorized outside of the political
institutions that are established to manage it, or even outside of larger world patterns of consumption
that condition environmental processes[5]. The paradox of the environmental security literature is that
the environment is often acknowledged as an increasingly important factor in understanding the
unfolding dimensions of world politics even as it is identified as a potential source misunderstanding and
obfuscation.
The three major traditions that deal with the environment-conflict linkage—neo-Malthusianism,
neoclassical economics, and political ecology—disagree in often stark terms about not only how the
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environment can be said to “cause” conflict, but also, what types of variables should be studied, how
they should be studied, and what type of language should be used to portray conclusions. Despite these
differences, each has something different to offer security planners seeking to understand the
environmental causes of conflict. This is perhaps best demonstrated by Colin Kahl's Demographic and
Environmental Stress Model, which integrates many of the insights from the three approaches. Taken
together, each of the traditions should give future students of the environment-conflict linkage pause
before making simplistic and automatic assumptions about the way scarcity and degradation cause
conflict. Because of the importance of the environment-conflict linkage for understanding world politics,
the article will finish with some suggestions for how scholars can further explore the relationship and
integrate the insights into scenarios for climate change.
II. Which environmental cause? Whose security?: Different Perspectives in the Study of
Environmental Security
Even though the problems of environmental stress have been a concern for communities since the
beginning of time, the advent of “environmental security” as a major disciplinary and national security
concern is a relatively new phenomenon. The idea that environmental scarcity could fuel a future world
of ungovernable spaces was first elaborated in the scholarship of Thomas Homer-Dixon[6] and then
popularized by Robert Kaplan in his famous 1994 article in the Atlantic Monthly .[7] Since then, linkages
between environmental causes and conflict have been made for the Rwandan genocide, the civil war in
the Darfur region of Sudan, and for violence in Pakistan, Somalia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, to
name just a few.[8] Concerns with environmental security have made their way into distinct agendas of
security—embedding itself in the discourses of national security (the United States being an example),
comprehensive security (an example being Japan), but also as a part of movements for a more just
human security (see for example UN bureaucracies like the United Nations Development Programme
and United National Environmental Programme). In response to government and public demand, in the
last two decades scholars have produced voluminous research regarding the relationship between the
environment, politics, and conflict.
Reading through the literature one is often struck by the sheer number of issues that are explored under
the environmental security label. The literature on environmental security discusses instance when
states or substate groups come into conflict directly over resources, when subnational groups use a
valuable resource to finance rebellion, when degradation or scarcity produces grievance-based violence,
or when environmental problems overwhelm government legitimacy, and thus, provide permissive
conditions for rebellion.[9] Within this hodgepodge of concerns, the “environment” can come to stand for
land scarcity, soil erosion, depletion of freshwater, timber, or fish stocks, demographic pressure that can
lead to these effects, or even strategically valuable resource wealth like petroleum and mineral reserves.
In addition, “security” can mean anything from threats to regime security, threats to regional or
international order, or threats to people’s health and livelihood. Given that many of the issues within
what is called the “environmental security” literature often deal with grievances, distributional justice,
and/or structural violence (rather than threats to “national security” narrowly defined) some authors have
argued that it is more accurate to describe the enterprise as the study of environmental insecurity.[10]
Generally speaking, there are three different traditions of examining the linkage between environmental
causes, politics, and conflict: neo-Malthusianism, neoclassical economics, and political ecology.[11]
Each of these three approaches represents a different theoretical tradition, angle of vision, and political
objective. The neo-Malthusian approach emphasizes the way trends in demography and the
environment create acute scarcities that contribute to violent conflict. Alternatively, the neoclassical
economics tradition stresses the adaptability of human systems (especially free market and democratic
systems) in dealing with problems of the environment. Political ecology approaches—while more varied
and difficult to lump together—generally share a concern for the liberation of impoverished and
oppressed groups and try to deconstruct the way specialized forms of knowledge and discourse have
been used to oppress marginalized groups. In addition to these three approaches, I also examine the
claims of environmental skeptics as a fourth “school” for discussion. Typically, skeptics have come from
both the neoclassical economics and the political ecology groups (though often for different reasons).
As my short sketches will demonstrate, though each approach has very important—and in some case
irreconcilable—differences, they also have important linkages and create forms of knowledge that
compliment the other.
The Neo-Malthusian Approach
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Neo-Malthusians generally point to accelerating pressures on natural resources and planetary life-
support systems as a major cause of conflict in the future. Though the notion that population growth
itself puts strains on the planet has long been refuted, this groups often links population growth with
environmental degradation and the failure of political institutions to manage environmental uses.[12]
These failures can lead to increased migration, threats to state stability, increased state oppression to
preempt threats to the state, and conflict between the state and aggrieved ethnic or political groups.
Homer-Dixon's work in the nineties in particular has been very influential. Homer-Dixon's chief argument
is that, as opposed to earlier times when human adaptive capacities were activated, mutually reinforcing
patterns of degradation make the current crises—in particular the environmental effects of climate
change—more difficult to overcome.[13] The later contributions of the scholars in what is called the
Toronto School (including Homer-Dixon's work) explore the complexity involved in the environment-
conflict linkage using primarily case study analysis. Many of these studies found that, while
environmental factors were rarely necessary or sufficient conditions, they nevertheless lead to structural
opportunities for violence.
Critics have pointed to neo-Malthusianism’s pension for environmental determinism. Neo-Malthusians
have been accused of ignoring both interactions with political institutions that make conflict more likely
and the way political institutions and ideas help produce scarcity to begin with. Though scholars such as
Barnett[14] laud the sophistication of case study work done by Homer-Dixon and others as part of the
Toronto School's Project on Environment, Population, and Security, critics still suggest that the
“positivist vernacular”[15] used by neo-Malthusians often denotes a linear relationship between
environmental stress and conflict that has yet to be proven.
Because neo-Malthusians focus on the environment as an independent variable, they also ignore
important dynamics involved in civil war onset. As the literature on civil strife points out,[16] revolts are
often difficult to start because of problems of coordination and the free-rider dilemma. The freerider
problem in civil wars amounts to this: how does a revolt start when the risk taken on by the initial
organizers is so much greater than the risk taken on by those who decide to bandwagon later on? Thus,
critics of the neo-Malthusian approach point out that an emphasis on resource scarcity over-predicts the
occurrence of civil strife.
Neoclassical Economics
In the neoclassical economic approach, much more of an emphasis is put on the human capacity to
cope with environmental change and, in a rebuttal to neo-Malthusians, resource abundance (not
scarcity) is linked with conflict.[17] For scholars in this group, the market mechanism plays an important
role. Market incentives triggered by scarcity lead to new innovations in technology and management to
create coping mechanisms. In a similar way, representative governments respond to political demands
to obviate critical scarcities that affect their constituencies. In addition, those who focus on the “resource
curse” could be placed into this group. The abundance of a highly valued commodity severely stunts the
development of sophisticated, variegated market economies by giving incentives for parties to find and
hold valuable resources rather than innovate. The availability of resources also stunts the development
of governments responsive to citizen needs, giving incentives for the government to be just strong
enough to hold valuable territory and live off rents from its resources. In what is termed the “honey pot”
hypothesis, resource abundance creates incentives for groups to capture resources. Where there is a
weak state, substate groups can compete with the government for control of these resources. This
literature tends to emphasize “greed” (defined as opportunities for banditry or state capture in order to
generate income) over “grievance” (defined as human rights abuses and political oppression) as
motivation for intrastate conflict.
Critics of the neoclassical economics approach have pointed out that on a local scale the mechanisms
for mediating resource scarcity, in the form of a market mechanism or a responsive government, are
often imperfect or absent in much of the less developed world. On a global scale, critics point out that—
in contrast to past claims of impending demographic doom—current negative trends of population
growth, consumption, and environmental limits are much more embedded and reinforcing than was ever
the case before. As Homer-Dixon argues, these patterns lend themselves to reinforcement and trigger
effects that stress the environment in irreversible ways.[18]
In addition, a great deal (though not all) of the “honey pot” theories tend to focus more on nonrenewable
resources than renewable resources that have been overstressed. Forestry, fisheries, and agriculture—
resources that are renewable when used in moderation—tend to contribute to the employment of large
populations. When these resources are depleted, much larger portions of the population suffer, leading
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to grievance-based violence. Moreover, the neoclassical economics approach ignores the way “resource
curse” explanations can be linked with the neo-Malthusian literature:[19] the availability of resource
rents from nonrenewable resources like oil might prevent the government from undertaking policies to
manage renewable resources like fisheries or agricultural land in ways that benefit the larger population.
Over time, this neglect could lead to clashes among substate groups over increasingly scarce resources.
These critical scarcities might also create better incentives for people to join rebel groups (the “greed”
explanation) to capture valuable nonrenewable resources.
Political Ecology
Though very difficult to encapsulate in a thumbnail sketch, political ecology can be described as a mix of
post-structural and critical theory, non-equilibrium ecology, and rich ethnographic case study analysis.
While this captures some of the essence of the approach, another way to think of this tradition is in
terms of its normative objectives. Political ecology tends to focus less on accumulating and testing
generalizable theories and more on interrogating the complexity of social and ecological relationships. In
particular, the literature is interested in exposing how systems of environmental management often
disenfranchise the poor.[20] Thus, as the title of Peet and Watt’s book Liberation Ecologies suggests, a
key theme in political ecology is creating a scholarship that can foster the liberation of marginalized
people.
Much of the literature is also hostile to the neo-Malthusian approach and the way its scholarship has
informed US strategic thinking since the mid-90s. A common accusation of political ecologists is that
neo-Malthusians posit simplistic linkages between environmental degradation, scarcity, and conflict. In
addition, they criticize neo-Malthusians for ignoring the way scarcities are conditioned by larger systems
—domestic and local systems, but in some cases world systems—of production and consumption.[21]
For Kahl, political ecology’s focus on regimes of production and distribution misses just how much
material factors matter. Kahl criticizes political ecologists for downplaying the role of environmental
stress in conflict; instead, he highlights the way the material fact of demographic stress conspires with
systems of inequality to cause conflict.[22] Even though political ecology’s case study approach to
environmental factors has provided a solid contribution to the field, political ecologists have nonetheless
been dismissive of the contributions and nuance of Toronto school (neo-Malthusian) case studies.[23]
Perhaps the strongest criticism of political ecology has to do with its lack of policy relevance. Because
political ecology studies often seek to upset simplistic ways of viewing the world, their work often suffers
from a high degree of indeterminacy.[24] Thus, unlike for example the work of think tank policy papers,
their conclusions are rarely reducible to easy-to-read executive summaries or bullet points. This is at
once a major strength of political ecology studies, but also a major limitation on their ability to reach
mainstream audiences.
Environmental Security Skepticism
Finally, it should be noted that there is also a strain of literature that questions the salience of the
environment-conflict linkage. In a sense, this is a continuation of the skepticism found in the neoclassical
and political ecology approaches. This literature, however, is important enough to include in its own
section because it questions the very merit of the explosion of interest in “environmental security.”
Raleigh and Urdal, for example, note that statistical literature studies that include a large number of
cases (a large N) is at best mixed on the association between resource scarcity and violence.[25] While
the State Failure Task Force Report of the late 90s[26] found that soil degradation, deforestation, and
freshwater scarcity were not directly linked to conflict, Hauge and Ellington (1998) found that the same
factors, with high population density, were highly associated with civil war—but also, that these factors
were secondary to political factors.[27] Theisen, however, is unable to replicate the results of Hauge
and Ellington in his statistical study. He concludes that because the Hauge and Ellington study is so
frequently the sole statistical study cited in the environmental security literature, and because these
results are not subject to replication, the relationship between scarcity, degradation, and conflict has
very little support in the large statistical study research.[28]
In addition, criticisms of the environmental security literature have also come from the political ecology
camp. Environmental security models that rely on understandings of the environment as an
“independent variable” often simplify complex processes that reflect the issue of resource distribution
and discourses that drive these distribution patterns. As Benjaminsen argues, reading the neo-
Malthusian literature one “often gets the impression that degradation is something measurable” when the
idea of degradation is always subject to “conflicting views regarding how the land should be used and
Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at NPS - Online Journal
http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/WebJournal/Article.aspx?ArticleID=68[10/5/2011 11:15:33 AM]
what the landscape ought to look like.”[29] In addition, the environmental security literature tends to
treat “conflicts as internal to ‘groups’ or ‘societies’ with little or no analysis of interactions with the
international political economy.”[30] This approach, then, leaves larger issues of global environmental
justice unexplored.
As will be discussed below, Kahl partially solves the problem of simplistic notions of scarcity by including
a political variable in his notion of scarcity—scarcity can be produced in populations by the
maldistribution of resources. In addition, by making the political pathways to violence explicit, Kahl’s
model is better able to account for instances of where violence does not occur.
III. An Attempt to Integrate Prior Approaches: Colin Kahl’s Model
Thus far, Kahl’s Demographic and Environmental Stress Model (DES) has done the most to integrate
environmental and political variables into one comprehensive account. The independent variable in the
model—demographic and environmental stress (DES) is a composite variable that encompasses (1)
rapid population growth (2) the degradation of renewable resources and (3) the maldistribution of
renewable resources. It should be noted that the third variable assumes that political, social, and
economic processes have an important impact on the way scarcity is produced in populations (a
concession to political ecology). A resource may be in ready supply, yet nevertheless experienced as
scarce by local populations because the resource is so poorly distributed or managed.
The author contends that there are two main pathways through which DES can cause violence—state
failure and state exploitation. The state failure pathway creates incentives for “social groups to engage
in violence via the logic of the security dilemma.”[31] In other words, as crucial resources become
scarce rival states or substate groups will be more likely to compete for these resources. When this
happens within the state, fierce competition can reduce the government to merely one competitor
amongst other comparatively powerful groups. The state exploitation pathway, however, assumes a
different dynamic. In this pathway, better organized and powerful state elites are able to preempt
competition from competitor groups or capture scarce resources through violence in order to protect
their own narrow self-interests.[32] Kahl argues that groupness (the degree to which people align with
an ethnic, religious, or class group over the state) and institutional inclusivity (the degree to which
important government institutions allow diverse groups to influence policy through legitimate processes)
are important for understanding whether DES leads to conflict.[33] In the case of groupness, strong
cleavages in group affiliations within the state and the absence of cross-cutting loyalties and
identifications help to overcome the collective action problem early in revolts (the freerider problem
identified in the civil strife literature noted above). By contrast, an ethnically homogenous state, a unified
national identity, or cross-cutting identifications can help neutralize conflict.[34] Similarly, an inclusive
government with legitimate processes for protesting policies can also help neutralize violent conflict. In
contrast, government processes that exclude large populations with high levels of groupness will fuel the
logic of the security dilemma.
The strength of the state to deter violence plays a significant role in determining the pathways of
violence. When elites are unified against a weaker minority, higher levels of DES will be needed to push
minority groups toward violent revolt. In this case, state exploitation is the most likely pathway. In cases
where the minority is especially weak and state capacities for oppression extremely advanced, violence
may not even register because it is deeply submerged in state structures of human rights abuses. In the
case of state weakness, substate actors will find it easier to garner support among their in-group and
challenge the state for ever scarcer resources, thus leading to greater challenges to state authority.[35]
By taking into account the importance of demographic and environmental stresses as an independent
variable, Kahl work addresses the neo-Malthusian “independent variable;” however, by acknowledging
the way distribution systems create scarcity, he also acknowledges some of the concerns of political
ecology. Finally, by demonstrating how dysfunctional coping methods are the pathways toward conflict,
Kahl demonstrates how the insights of the neoclassical economics approach can inform studies of the
environment-conflict linkage.
IV. The Limitations of the DES model
Though Kahl’s model is a significant achievement, there are nevertheless several important gaps that
need to be explored.
First, along the lines of political ecology, the model fails to take into account the complex ways that DES
is a product of the deep structural processes of power within the world system. Though DES assumes
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maldistribution as a key process which produces scarcity in disadvantaged populations, the model
leaves the global systems of production and consumption that help to create scarcities un-(or under)-
theorized.[36] For example, Kahl’s model fails to take into account how much the measured “stress” in
the independent variable is due to the combination of oil shocks, rising interest rates, falling/ rising
commodity prices, and the structural adjustment programs during the period of conflict. Though a
discussion of these factors does appear in Kahl’s discussion section, they are largely exogenous to his
model. Maldistribution, in other words, may be the condition of a larger story that includes more than just
relations between civil society and local government. This larger story may also be more important
theoretically if our concern is the welfare of vulnerable populations in the Global South.[37]
Second, along the lines of neoclassical economics, the model fails to take into account the processes of
productive institutions and mechanisms that can reflect back on DES to alleviate these problems to
begin with. In other words, Kahl never closes the circle. As the neoclassical economic position notes,
market mechanisms and democratic institutions can not only relax mechanisms of civil strife, but also
help alleviate the problem of DES through adaptive processes. These adaptive processes should not be
limited to so-called rational management approaches to the environment either. There is a wealth of
scholarship, for example, that points to effective indigenous methods for land management. This
problem remains unresolved because Kahl’s concern is civil strife, not processes of environmental
management. Yet, as many authors have argued, understanding what process are available for
managing environmental stress is just as important as understanding why conflict occurs.[38]
My third critique regards the positioning of DES as an important independent variable. As my review of
the “skeptics” above notes, the statistical literature currently finds only a weak association between
environmental degradation and conflict. While demographic stress and the grievance of populations
makes this independent variable more significant, lumping the three together into a composite variable
misses just how different each of these variables are in their relationship to the onset of violence. Thus,
one could imagine the model drawn much differently. Theisen’s conclusion that political dysfunction and
poverty have much more explanatory power than resource scarcity,[39] for example, suggests that
political issues and poverty should be positioned as the independent variable, with the environmental
factors positioned as intervening variables.
A fourth critique can be directed at Kahl’s methodological approach. Because Kahl relies heavily on two
case studies to elucidate his claims (the Philippines and Kenya), his study is limited to a thick
description of DES and the intervening variables of groupness and institutional inclusivity to
demonstrate the utility of his model. As he states, one of the reasons he decides to take this route is
because much of the data he needs is not easily quantifiable. In addition, Kahl claims that statistical
approaches are not very effective at answering “how” questions.[40] Though Kahl is largely correct, his
approach nevertheless does little to counter environmental security skepticism. Future scholars will need
to think creatively of ways to test Kahl’s model through large N statistical studies.
My criticisms of Kahl’s model are purposely unfair: they ask the model to provide answers to questions
and to perform tasks it was never intended to do. Yet these criticism point to important avenues of
further research, facilitated by future conjunctions between research agendas. While future research
should not try to include everything, it should attempt to make important connections between currently
disparate approaches—for example, that between qualitative case study research and large quantitative
statistical studies, or that between the neo-Malthusian/ neoclassical economics approaches and political
ecology. Though Kahl’s approach is a good starting point, there is still much to be done.
V. Conclusion: New Paths of Exploration and Synthesis in the Study of the Environment, Politics,
and Conflict
As this article has shown, greater efforts to link the concerns of different traditions in environmental
security can help to construct a more nuanced understanding of the role the environment plays in the
onset and intensity of conflict. By incorporating both the environment and regimes of resource
distribution, Kahl avoids the either or trade-off between the two that is assumed in other approaches. As
my criticisms have shown, however, Kahl’s approach is far from perfect. Still, there are good reasons
why researchers should continue to look across traditions for insights on how environmental factors can
contribute to conflict. Even as defense planners begin to think about how climate change can lead to
civil war onset and interstate conflict, they will do well to remember the points made by environmental
security skeptics and especially the weak linkages that are found between environmental factors and
conflict in the statistical literature. As these studies have found, variables such as soil degradation,
deforestation, and water scarcity are at best secondary to issues of poverty, low economic growth, and
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high dependence on primary commodities for export.[41] These studies serve to remind us that
environmental factors are one part (sometimes even a relatively small part) of a larger picture.
Despite the work done by Kahl and other scholars, there are still quite a few avenues for improving the
state of knowledge on the role of environmental causes on conflict. Scholars and security planners
should continue to:
create greater synergies between statistical studies that look for relationships among a large
number of cases and more nuanced case studies that take into account how environmental
factors work in different political and social contexts. This will allow scholars and security
planners to understand the limit of generalizations about the environment and conflict.
direct more attention to smaller political units like provinces in order to complement larger
studies that use the state as their unit of analysis[42].
as a way of addressing environmental security skeptics, investigate the degree to which
instances where conflict does not register are actually instances where populations are suffering
from acute forms of political oppression and structural violence (in other words, environmentally
facilitated insecurity)[43].
examine the feedback loops that allow political institutions, ideas, and activism to react back on
environmental “independent variables”—both positively and negatively. This may mean
thoughtful engagement with the environmental management literature. The implication is that
understanding which state capacities are best at obviating environmental stress is just as
important as understanding how environmental stress causes conflict.
and finally, researchers should seek to avoid the mysticism that often accompanies positioning
the environment scarcities or valuable resources as “strong” independent variables. Scholars can
do so by looking at the role of political entrepreneurs in either promoting or helping to prevent
violent conflict in contexts of high environmental stress. By doing so, scholars and security
planners will also help to create more policy-relevant studies for those looking to intervene in
future crises.
As security planners continue to develop regional scenarios for climate change, it is important to
remember that there is nothing automatic about linkages between environmental causes and violence.
The evolution of politics in different regions will depend quite a bit on complex political and ecological
variables that are rarely clear cut. By comparing and contrasting the insights of statistical studies and in
depth case studies, security scholars can begin to understand that limitations of generalizations about
environmental variables as well as begin to identify new hypothesis for testing. An attention to building
nuance and sophistication in our understanding of the environment-conflict linkage will ultimately benefit
decision-makers and policy planners as they seek to understand the environmental factors in the future
of world politics.
Though the environmental security literature will continue to inform our understanding of conflict onset
and intensity in the twenty-first century, one should also be aware of the limitations of this research.
Much of the current and future literature, whether case studies or large statistical analyses, will be based
on what has happened in the past. An understanding of past cases may be of limited utility in
comparison with a very unique future. This future may include more acute forms of environmental stress
than could ever be found in studies of the recent past. Thus, even as scholars continue to probe for
relationships between different environmental causes and conflict, it is important for security planners
and analysts to be bolder than their academic counterparts. Whereas the scholarly community is more
apt to proclaim that the future is not evidence,[44] security planners will need to actively think about the
limits of current studies and account for the worst of all possible cases.
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